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HERBERT WECHSLER*

I

THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT: REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW AND THE LOGISTICS
OF DIRECT REVIEW
I am honored by the invitation to present the John Randolph
Tucker lecture for this year and grateful for the opportunity to join
you as you dedicate this gracious building to the cause of law and
legal education.
Those who have heard or read the Tucker lectures through the
years need not be told they are held in high esteem, both for the
tribute they express and for the contributions they have made. Since
the inaugural in 1949 by John W. Davis, a son of Washington & Lee
who was assuredly the greatest advocate of our century, your lecturers, including in their number friends whose memory we cherish, set
a standard it is difficult to meet.
My subject, as you know, concerns the jurisdiction of our highest
court, the tribunal that is certainly without an analogue throughout
the world in the magnitude of its responsibilities, measured by the
difficulty and importance of the issues it confronts, the finality of
many of its most transforming judgments short of constitutional
amendment, the number of judicial systems from which cases on its
docket may derive and the complexity of the mixed legal system in
the ordering of which it has the final voice.
The vehicle through which the Supreme Court discharges this
responsibility is its appellate jurisdiction, which presents in our time
two different but related types of challenge. The Court is vested, on
the one hand, with the old authority to review state court judgments
turning on the interpretation or the application of the Constitution,
laws and treaties of the Nation. It is, secondly, the ultimate authority
*

Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University

School of Law; Director, The American Law Institute.
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with respect to judgments of the "inferior" federal tribunals, the twotiered system of District and Circuit Courts endowed with jurisdiction to enforce the ever-growing corpus of congressional enactments,
to hold the federal government, including Congress, within the legal
limits of its charters and (subject to complex standards governing the
timing and appropriateness of its intervention) to afford redress
against the state officialdom when it has infringed or, in some cases,
threatens to infringe rights guaranteed by the supreme law.
On the face of things, this dual task recalls what Dr. Johnson said
about a very different matter: "it is like a dog walking on its hind
legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."
If this sounds like irreverence, I assure you that it is not so intended.
I mean only to express in the most graphic terms my sense for the
enormous difficulties of the role in our polity and legal system that
we have accorded to the highest court. It is, indeed, precisely that
abiding sense that leads me to invite you to reflect on the establishment and growth of the appellate jurisdiction, on some major issues
posed in the delineation of its scope and, finally, on the question
whether current problems of logistics (to conscript a military term
that has the overtones I seek) make a case for legislative action.
I
Establishment and Growth
The jurisdiction as it stands derives from almost two centuries of
controversy, growth and change. The main elements in that development may profitably be recalled.
It will be well to start at the beginning. The Constitution, as you
know, provides in Article III that "the judicial power of the United
States" shall be vested in "one supreme court" and "such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
It then lists nine categories of "cases" and "controversies" to which
"the judicial power shall extend," including most importantly "all
cases, in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of
the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority." In two of the nine categories of cases, it provides
that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction." In all the
others it is said that "the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, which such exceptions and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." This is, with minor additions, the full text that has generated over time the court structure
and enormous jurisdiction we now know.
The agent of this creation was, of course, the Congress, which,
starting in 1789, properly considered that, apart from the mandate
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to establish a supreme court vested with the two categories of original
jurisdiction, the Constitution posed questions of legislative policy as
to whether courts "inferior" to the supreme court should be established and, if so, how much of the possible range of the federal judicial
power should be encompassed in their jurisdiction, what "exceptions" should be made to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme
court and what "regulations" on its exercise imposed.
The first Judiciary Act took up the option to establish lower courts
but vested them with narrow jurisdiction, not including any general
competence in cases arising under federal law. The choice was rather
to leave such litigation for the most part to the state judiciaries,
subject under famous section 25 to review and reversal by the supreme court of a final judgment of the highest state tribunal having
jurisdiction to decide if, but only if, such judgment wrongly held
invalid a treaty or an Act of Congress or other national authority,
wrongly sustained a state statute or authority against a federal claim
of invalidity, or more generally, construed federal law or a federal
commission so as to hold against a right asserted thereunder, provided that the error assigned appeared on the face of the record and
"immediately" involved one of the enumerated federal rulings.
The net of this was that neither the jurisdiction of the lower courts
nor that of the highest court, nor both in combination, came close to
encompassing the full extent of the judicial power described in the
Constitution. The deficiency was promptly challenged in the courts
and the challenge no less promptly held unfounded. As to the lower
courts, the Supreme Court said in 1799: "Congress is not bound to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every subject, in every
form which the Constitution might warrant."' As to the Supreme
Court, the affirmative delineation of the scope of jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act was read to negative by implication all jurisdiction not
conferred, and thus to exercise pro tanto the power explicitly conferred on Congress to make exceptions to and regulate the Court's
appellate jurisdiction.2 These conclusions were foreshadowed by
Hamilton's exposition of the judiciary article in Nos. 81 and 82 of The
Federalistand reflect the Framers' premises and purposes as since
revealed by Madison's notes on the proceedings of the Convention.'
I Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799).
2 Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810); Wiscart v. Dauchy,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
The principal steps in the development of the judiciary article are summarized
in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPmo, H. WECHSLER, HART & WEcHsLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-21 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM].
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These dispositions were at first accepted without question but
they soon evoked a cross fire of attack from both friends and foes of
national authority. Mr. Justice Story, writing obiter in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,4 floated the nationalist critique, insisting that the
constitutional words "the judicial power . . . shall be vested" are
"used in an imperative sense", meaning that the "whole judicial
power of the United States should be, at all times, vested, either in
an original or appellate form, in some courts created under its authority". In the same case, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals had
held below that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could
not constitutionally be exerted to review a state court judgment,
because the "term appellate . . . necessarily includes the idea of
superiority" and "one Court cannot be correctly said to be superior
to another, unless both of them belong to the same sovereignty." 5 The
Supreme Court's disagreement was, of course, reflected in its judgment and reaffirmed in the great cases of succeeding years.'
I shall not dwell upon the nationalist critique put forth by Justice
Story, though its echoes still find some receptive ears.7 As Justice
White put it simply in a recent opinion "it did not survive later
cases."' Story was engaged in a sustained campaign to stimulate the
Congress to enlarge the jurisdiction of the lower courts and to expand
the fragmentary corpus of the national statutory law;9 and his dictum
must be viewed in that perspective. Even he did not consider the
constitutional "imperative" that he proclaimed (with only Justice
Johnson voicing disagreement) to be self-executing as a legal matter,
judged by his decisions sitting in the Circuit Court."0
It is worth pausing for a moment on the stance taken by the
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329-30 (1816).
Hunter v. Martin, Devisee of Fairfax, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 12 (1815).
E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 410 (1830); Cohens-v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See Warren,
Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the Twenty-Fifth Section of the JudiciaryAct, 47
AM. L. REV. 1, 161 (1913).

1 See, e.g., R.

BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT

285-96 (1969); 2 W.

CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

814 (1953); J.

785-

GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECE-

DENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 240-47 (1971); Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to
Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction,83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
157, 201-02 (1960); cf. Redish & Woods, CongressionalPower to Control Jurisdiction
of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv.
45 (1975).
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 n.9 (1973).
See 1 THE LIFE AND LETms OF JOSEPH STORY 271, 293 (W. W. Story ed. 1851).
" See, e.g., White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547).

19771

TUCKER LECTURE

1047

Virginia court against Supreme Court review of state court judgments, for it presents a puzzle I am not sure I can solve. Unlike the
later theorists of nullification and secession, the Court of Appeals did
not deny that federal judicial power could be used to achieve and to
enforce against litigants a nationwide interpretation of the federal
law which the Constitution explicitly declared to be supreme and
binding on state judges. It maintained rather that this uniformity
could only be attained by drawing cases to the original jurisdiction
of the lower national tribunals, whose judgments, it was granted, the
Supreme Court could review. That would have meant, however, as
John Randolph Tucker put it critically in his treatise on the Constitution, "a great abridgement of State jurisdiction in the primary stages
of the litigation, and a need for constant removal from the State to
the Federal courts, evenI in the midst of a trial when the Federal
question first emerged."
Why should the protagonists of state autonomy have preferred to
the marginal intrusion of direct review, with all the limitations it
imported, an alternative so plainly pointing to a larger federal
preemption? Was it a stratagem, based on the judgment that the
legislation necessary to expand the jurisdiction of the lower courts
could be obstructed in the Congress (as the expansion in the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801 had been aborted promptly by repeal when
the Republicans obtained control) - with the result that the state
courts would actually have the final word within the boundaries of
each state? This seems a likely explanation until it is remembered
that precisely the same issue, the review of state court judgments, so
'divided the Congress of the Confederacy that the Supreme Court
mandated by its Constitution never was established.1 2 Is the clue to
understanding simply that in this case, as no doubt in many others,
what to some was at the most a point of protocol for others was a point
of principle, transcending any practical considerations?
The crucial fact, in any case, was that the constitutional position
articulated in the early days survived the attacks from both directions, permitting the scope of federal judicial jurisdiction - both
initial and appellate - to be shaped by Congress over time, responding as in other legislative matters to felt needs for the displacement
of state competence and law by the exercise of national authority.
There was little change in the initial legislative plan before the
Civil War but I need hardly note that change was very rapid in its
112 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ITS
SIS, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATION 799 (Henry St. George Tucker ed. 1899).
,2See W. ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GREY 437 (1941).

GENE-
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wake. The power vested in the Nation's courts soon equaled and
transcended the ideal of Justice Story, with a strength, however, that
his view could not have possibly conferred. For the expanded jurisdiction did not derive only from the mandate of the generation that
approved and ratified the Constitution but also from a continuous,
contemporaneous approval, expressed in the statutes as they stood at
any time. Charles L. Black, Jr., in his Tucker lecture of two years ago
spoke of this role of Congress as "the rock on which rests the legitimacy of judicial work in a democracy" 3 and that for me is not an
overstatement.
It would more than exhaust my time to trace all the steps by
which judicial jurisdiction was enlarged to the enormous scope it has
today," but I shall mention some. The Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870
and 1871, enacted under the enforcement clauses of the War Amendments, the surviving parts of which have grown so strong in their old
age, began the practice of resorting to the lower courts rather than to
state tribunals for enforcement of the rights conferred. So too federal
habeas corpus was extended by the Act of 1868 to prisoners in state
custody who averred that their confinement was illegal under federal
law. Beyond this, the Act of 1875 conferred federal question jurisdiction across the board in civil cases, subject only to a jurisdictional
amount. The significance of these initial steps has steadily increased
with the enormous growth of federal enactments and judicial extrapolation of the constitutional restraints upon state action. Within our
lifetimes, the magnitude of federal regulation of enterprise and of
existence, with concomitant reliance on the federal courts for review
and for enforcement, surely has been the most striking fact of legal
life. Its magnitude is no doubt growing even as we pause for these
reflections.
Needless to say, this great development has placed a burden on
the federal courts that always has grown heavier more quickly than
judicial personnel has been enlarged; congressional neglect upon this
score has not only been a recent scandal. The burden on the Supreme
Court was, however, lightened when the Evarts Act of 1891 established the circuit courts of appeals, which increasingly became the
only forum for appellate review of federal judgments as of right, with
further access to the Supreme Court only on certiorari in the Court's
discretion. The culmination of that progression in the Judges' Bill of
Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 846 (1975).
,4The progressive legislative expansion is traced in detail in THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 439-41 (Supreme Court), 844-50 (federal
question: inferior courts), 1424-30 (federal habeas corpus), 1326-39 (civil actions
against federal government and officials). See also id. 125, 218-19 (Supp. 1977).
13
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1925, sponsored by the Court itself, has recently become more meaningful as legislation, including significant enactments of the last three
years, has done away with the requirements of three-judge district
courts, and direct appeal of their judgments to the Supreme Court,
in almost all the cases for which that alternate system had been
established and for many years maintained.'" The few remaining categories in which the Supreme Court still is obliged to assume jurisdiction over federal decisions should have small practical importance
and may soon succumb to the extension of the present legislative
trend.
The statute governing appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments is still closer to its formulation in the Act of 1789 but here too
there has been important change. The jurisdiction was enlarged in
1914 to include cases where the federal claim was sustained by the
state court as well as those in which it was denied. In such case,
however, review was made discretionary on certiorari, a plan that was
adopted on a wider scale in the Judges Bill of 1925. Review as of right
(the term "appeal" being substituted for writ of error in 1928) was
preserved only when the state court final'" judgment holds invalid a
treaty or an Act of Congress or sustains a state statute" challenged
on federal grounds. That is the present situation.
'5 The recent enactments are: P.L. No. 93-528, §§ 4 & 5 (1974), 15 U.S.C. §§ 28,
29, 49 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45 (Expediting Act); P.L. No. 93-584, § 7 (1975) repealing 28
U.S.C. § 2325 (review of I.C.C. orders); P.L. No. 94-381 (1976) repealing28 U.S.C. §§
2281, 2282 and adding § 2284 and § 2403(b) (three judge court preserved only in actions
,challenging constitutionality of apportionment of congressional districts or state-wide
legislative body or otherwise "required by act of Congress"). The latter reference
encompasses Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(g), 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b)
(1970), and Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c, 1973h(c) (1970).
11The Supreme Court's interpretation of the finality requirement, importing significant relaxation of its rigor, is summarized by Mr. Justice White in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 466, 477-86 (1975).
'1 The term "statute" is interpreted to include not only state constitutional provisions and legislative enactments but also municipal ordinances and administrative
regulations or orders. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Hamilton v. Regents of
Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Sultan Ry. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S.
135 (1928); King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100 (1928). Moreover, "validity" is held
to have been drawn in issue and sustained by rejection of a challenge to a statute "as
applied" in the particular case, i.e., to the determinative facts before the court, notwithstanding its validity upon its face, i.e., in its general application. Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921). The point must have been raised
explicitly, however, as an issue of validity, as distinguished from a claim of immunity
to the attempted application. See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 721
(1961); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 244 (1958); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 650-51 (1942).

1050

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

II
Problems of Scope
In sketching the development of the appellate jurisdiction, I have
painted necessarily with a broad brush, omitting matters of detail. I
turn now to a closer scrutiny of the scope of the authority implicit in
the granted jurisdiction.
Few questions of this order should arise in the review of federal
decisions. The system now established for that function, with the
virtual elimination of direct appeals from district courts, should present a minimum of legal problems. Cases will derive almost entirely
from the federal appellate courts; and whether to review, how far and
when (for certiorari may be granted before judgment) are questions
to be answered in the Court's discretion. How such discretion can be
best employed, and what its full potentialities may be, are matters
of immense importance for the legal system that have recently commanded much attention, as you know. 8 I pass them, however, to
consider the scope of jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts.
Here legal questions of importance have arisen and quite plainly will
continue to arise.
1. Adequate State Ground: Substantive. The initial question is
the old one of how far the tradition that confines review to the adjudication of controlling federal questions (a point you will recall that was
explicit in the Act of 1789 though the proviso was repealed in 1867)"9
precludes the Court from passing upon issues of state law. This always has been viewed as a matter of much moment for the dual
system, epitomized by the much quoted statement by Justice BenjaSee, e.g., the materials and references collected in THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 1600-31, and at 1-4, 278-79 (Supp. 1977).
" In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), and companion
cases it was argued that the effect of the repeal of the proviso was to extend the scope
of Supreme Court review of a state judgment beyond the claim that a federal right had
"

FEDERAL

been denied to the entire case, including independent issues of state law. Mr. Justice
Curtis, who had resigned from the Supreme Court after the decision in Dred Scott,
filed a brief amicus in support of this submission, see 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 602-06;
B. CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES

54-58 (1880), which enlisted the votes of three of the eight sitting

justices (Bradley, Clifford and Swayne), notwithstanding the useless distortion of the
dual system such a change would have involved. The majority declined to attribute to
Congress a purpose to accomplish that result, reserving the question of its constitution-

ality.
The repeal was, however, accorded one effect of prime importance, that of includ-

ing the state court opinions in the record on review. It is hard to understand today how
the system was administered for eighty-five years without recourse to state court
opinions in appraising what the state decision held and on what grounds.
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min R. Curtis that "questions of jurisdiction were questions of power
as between the United States and the several States.""0 The regime
of Swift v. Tyson posed an analogous problem that my generation
studied with great passion, hailing its demise in 1938.21 The issue was,
however, even more intense in the setting of direct review, since by
hypothesis the state court then had expounded the state law not
merely in its earlier decisions but in the very case at bar. It was clear
nonetheless that complete state autonomy was inadmissible and that
the answer had to turn on the relationship of the state ruling to the
federal right that was asserted and denied.
To illustrate, I turn again to Martinv. Hunter's Lessee, though it
was not the first case that provided an example. 2 The Treaty of Paris
of 1783 ending the Revolutionary War embodied a guarantee against
"future confiscations" by either nation of property belonging to individuals with allegiance to the other. The Jay Treaty of 1794 enhanced
the safeguard by explicitly assuring the security of such alien land
titles "according to the nature and tenure of their respective estates,"
with the aliens accorded the right to "grant, sell or devise" to anyone
"as if they were natives." Lord Fairfax had died in 1781, devising his
huge estate in the Virginia Northern Neck to his British nephew,
Martin, who in turn assigned his interest to a syndicate including
John Marshall and his brother James. The question litigated was
whether Martin had a title when the treaties came in force. If he did,
it was common ground that it received protection. But Hunter, claiming under a grant from the Commonwealth in 1789 denied that there
was any title to protect, claiming that the property had escheated or
'been confiscated by the state before the treaties could apply. Though
Virginia judges differed on the point, the Court of Appeals sustained
Hunter. The Supreme Court reversed,23 holding that the question of
title, and not merely the uncontroverted meaning of the treaties, was
subject to review. Justice Johnson dissented on the ground that "the
interest acquired under the devise was a mere scintillajuris"that had
been "extinguished by the grant of the state" but he shared the view
of the Court (Marshall, C.J.; not participating) that under the Judiciary Act, as he put it, an inquiry into "the title of the parties" was
necessary and "must, in the nature of things, precede the consideration how far the law, treaty, and so forth, is applicable to it; otherwise, an appeal to this court would be worse than nugatory. '2
" Tribute to Chief Justice Taney, October 15, 1864, reprintedin,
BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTs 336, 340-41 (B. Curtis ed. 1879).

2 A MEMOIR

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286 (1810).
21 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
24 Id. at 631-32.
22

'

OF
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This was a treaty case but note its analogue in many areas of
constitutional litigation. Article I, section 10 forbids a state to pass
any law impairing the obligation of contract, but whether particular
transactions or events created a contract and, if so, what its obligations were, surely are matters governed usually by state law., A state
may not deprive of "property" without due process of law and presumably may not take it for a public use without payment of just
compensation. But apart from exceptional cases where entitlements
may be derived from Acts of Congress, must not the property interest
claimed to be impaired or taken derive its existence from the law
established or accepted by the state?"8 Other examples might be
given, such as full faith and credit cases or the recent judgments as
to when the due process clause demands a hearing,n but these illustrations should suffice to make the point.
In such situations, where, to put the matter analytically, the existence or the application of a federal right turns on a logically antecedent finding on a matter of state law, it is essential to the Court's
performance of its function that it exercise an ancillary jurisdiction
to consider the state question. Federal rights could otherwise be nullified by the manipulation of state law. How rigorous the scrutiny of
the state finding is or ought to be presents a harder question. The
decisions cover a wide range from Justice Story's wholly independent
judgment on the title issue in the Hunter case, often duplicated in
the contracts cases, 8 to a more lenient criterion, phrased as whether
there was "a fair or substantial basis"" for the state court's judgment
or even whether it was "manifestly wrong.

'3

I should suppose that

some degree of deference is plainly due to the state finding but that,
whatever formula is used, any meaningful review obliges the Supreme Court to consider whether, given the relevant state materials,
it clearly would have judged the issue differently if it were the state's
highest court. When dubiety persists, the state determination should
prevail and normally it does.
11See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Appleby v. City
of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
2, See, e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944); Muhlker v. Harlem
R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905); cf. Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537,
aff'd on rehearing, 282 U.S. 187 (1930).
2 E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
1 See note 25 supra; see also, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 561
(1942); Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923).
E.g., Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944).
Hale v. State Board, 302 U.S. 95, 101 (1937).
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2. Adequate State Ground: Procedural.I have referred thus far
to situations where the antecedent question involves the substantive
law of the state, property, contract and the like. But since federal
claims in state proceedings must, like other claims, be put forth in
accordance with the state procedure (the statute says they must be
"drawn in question") ,3 there is an important class of cases where the
antecedent state law finding is that the requirements of state procedure were not met, with the results that the claim was not considered
on the merits. The case is easy if the state procedural requirement
does not afford a reasonable opportunity to raise the claim at all. It
will be rejected as invalid on due process grounds,3 and also probably
a disrespect for federal supremacy, and thus will not obstruct review,
since an improper state refusal to adjudicate a federal contention is
equivalent to its denial.3 This is, however, the rare case. The more
common case, where the state procedural requirement invoked by the
state court is not itself unconstitutional, presents the problem with
which we are here concerned. It was long considered that unless the
procedural determination imposed a novel ruling in the case at hand
without substantial basis in the prior state materials, 3' the Supreme
Court could not review the merits of the federal assertion. 35 Procedural rulings were, in short, treated very much in the same way as
substantive rulings on antecedent issues of state law. Indeed, my
colleague, Alfred Hill, concluded after a long study of the cases that
the high Court probably had shown more deference to state decisions
on procedure than to those on substance in considering such ancillary
36

questions .

In Henry v. Mississippi37 in 1965, the Supreme Court by a bare
majority took a contrary view. The Mississippi Supreme Court had
held, after some vacillation on the question, that the failure to object
to evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment when the
evidence was offered barred consideration of the question, even
though the point was taken later on a motion for directed verdict. In

I

3'

28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970). The phrase derives from § 25 of the Act of 1789, 1 Stat.

85.
E.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317
(1917).
33

Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 282 (1932).

3, See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1964); NAACP v.

Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 294-302 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958).
-1 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 n.4 (1964) (involuntary general appearance as waiver of objection to personal jurisdiction).
Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 943, 991 (1965).
379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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reversing and remanding, Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion distinguished between rulings on substance and procedure on the surprising ground that in the substantive situation, decision of the federal
question by the Supreme Court would amount to an advisory opinion
only, because the ruling on the state law question is not subject to
review (and accordingly would stand) whereas "a procedural default
which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state courts, even
grounds, prevents implementation of the
on federal constitutional
'38
federal right.
The opinion suffers, in my view, from a patent analytical defect
in the significance that it attaches to the distinction between substance and procedure. State court rulings on substantive state questions obviously may prevent "the implementation" of a federal right
no less than state procedural determinations, witness the title issue
in the Hunter case, the contract issue when impairment is asserted,
the property issue when a deprivation without due process is claimed,
and other illustrations I have given. In such cases, as in those where
the state ruling found procedural default, the point is simply that the
existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns on
the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law. Because of
that relationship the state court does not speak the final word on the
state question, though the state materials remain controlling in the
Supreme Court's review. The problem of federal-state relations is the
same, moreover, whether the antecedent state law issue is substantive or procedural. It is difficult to understand, therefore, why there
should be a difference in the nature or the scope of the Supreme
Court's examination of the state determination. The thrust of the
decisions before Henry was, indeed, to find a common measure of
review for all such antecedent questions. 9
Nonetheless, the principle advanced in Henry that a state procedural rule that bars a federal challenge must be one that serves "a
legitimate state interest"4 may be regarded as constructive, whatever
one may think of its application in that case. In criminal cases especially, where under Fay v. Noia,41 decided in 1963, federal collateral
Id. at 447.
See, e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944); Broad River Power
Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537 (1930); see also, e.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co.
v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 654-55 (1942).
4o379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965).
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that a procedural default that would constitute an
adequate state ground precluding direct review of the federal claim asserted does not
bar post-conviction review of the claim on petition for a writ of habeas corpus, subject
to a "limited discretion" to deny relief to a petitioner who "has deliberately by-passed
39
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attack is broader than federal direct review, the system presents an
anomaly" that Henry would reduce to some extent. That was undoubtedly a factor in its motivation, unless we are to think that it was
merely an ad hoc decision in an especially appealing case. But
whether the Henry principle has really been established may still be
an open question. The decisions of the last twelve years do not dispel
the possibility that it is merely being treated with intelligent neglect. 3 Congress might, however, make a contribution here if it should
ever legislate to limit federal collateral attack, as many, including
notably Judge Henry Friendly,44 have been urging for so long, by also
legislating against hypertechnical refusal by state courts to rule on
constitutional objections, opening the issue in such cases to direct
review. Some adaptation of the Henry concept might be used in
drafting such a safeguard. Congress traditionally has been hesitant
to impose procedural requirements on state courts, even with respect
to litigation that has federal dimension, but its power to do so seems
5
entirely clear on principle as well as on authority.
the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court
remedies" id. at 438).
12The extent of the anomaly was reduced to some extent by the decisions in Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (claims under exclusionary rule of fourth amendment
not litigable on federal habeas when petitioner had opportunity for "full and fair"
litigation of claim in state courts) and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)
(federal habeas corpus unavailable to litigate constitutional challenge to composition
of state grand jury where petitioner failed to raise the question before trial as required
by state procedural rule similar to FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), see Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), absent showing of cause for non-compliance with state rule
and prejudice resulting from alleged federal deprivation. See also Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501 (1976); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
Since this lecture was delivered, the availability of federal habeas in cases involving state procedural default has been curtailed in general by the Supreme Court's
abandonment of the "deliberate by-pass" test of Fay v. Noia in favor of the "cause"
and "prejudice" requirements of Francis v. Henderson. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct.
2497 (1977). How far federal collateral attack will still be broader than direct review
turns on the content that is given these new terms. The Court went no further than to
say that the new formula "will afford an adequate guarantee . . . that the rule will
not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal
constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will
be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." 97 S. Ct. at 2508.
11The cases are collected in THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM,supra
note 3, at 557-62 (2d ed. 1973), 99 (Supp. 1977).
11 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38
U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
11 No direct holding on the proposition can be adduced but this surely is the
necessary implication of decisions such as Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R.,
342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966). See
also C. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 196 (3d ed. 1976).
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What I have said is not addressed at all to cases that present state
and federal contentions that are wholly independent of each other,
so that either, if sustained, would be dispositive.46 The simple illustration is the case where a litigant relies on both the national and
the state constitutions to support a claim of invalidity of a state action. Here it is true that if the state court sustains the claim on the
state ground, or even on both state and federal, the Supreme Court
quite properly disclaims all jurisdiction." The ruling on state law
neither evades nor threatens rights deriving from the national authority, and a finding of error on the federal ground would not undermine the state law basis of the judgment. There is, in short, no pendent jurisdiction on direct review because, unlike the situation as to
cases in the lower courts, it would serve no valid purpose in the dual
system. This is, indeed, one of the major virtues of direct review, its
marginal intrusion upon state authority; federal adjudication is confined to cases where it is a bare necessity to maintain the effectiveness and uniformity of the federal law. Far from expanding jurisdiction in this area, the tempting course is to find ways to induce state
courts to forego federal determinations until and unless dispositive
state grounds have been eliminated from the case. That seems to me
what a responsible state court should do, contrary to some recent
illustrations, 8 but whether Congress or the Supreme Court could
require that result, without penalizing litigants who by hypothesis
are not at fault, is a puzzle, I confess, I have not solved.
" That was the case, for example, in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1875) cited by Justice Brennan in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443
(1965), as the prototype of "cases involving state substantive grounds." The point was,
however, that the state ground was separately and independently dispositive, rather
than logically antecedent as in Hunter.
11E.g., New York City v. Central Savings Bank, 306 U.S. 661 (1939); see Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1940); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849, 2852-54 (1977); cf. Department of Mental Hygiene
v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1965).
11See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin,
410 U.S. 623 (1973).
Compare the incredible attack on the Supreme Court of California by the State
Attorney General for that Court's invalidation of capital punishment under the "cruel
or unusual" clause of the state constitution (People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493
P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972)), while the issue of federal validity was pending in
other cases in the Supreme Court. See Falk, Jr., The State Constitution:A More Than
"Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAuF. L. REV. 273, 274 n.5 (1973). For a general
discussion of the issue see Falk, Jr., supra; Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750 (1972); Barrett, Jr., Anderson and the Judicial
Function, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 739 (1972). See also Linde, Without "Due Process", 49
ORE. L. REv. 125 (1970).
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3. Review of FactualFindings.Another aspect of review of state
court judgments is the question of how far findings of fact in the state
system are open to review when they control the disposition of the
federal claim. This was a problem that hardly could arise under the
old practice that employed the writ of error with its narrow limitation
of the record. Under modern practice it presents a frequently recurring issue.
I need not tell you how important this can be. In Norris v.
Alabama,49 for example, the 1935 seminal decision on racial exclusion
from juries, the Alabama Court had held that a trial court finding
that no exclusion had been practiced was sufficiently supported by
the testimony of the jury commissioners to that effect. The unanimous reversal, with opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, held that
"whenever a conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal right
and findings of fact are so intermingled that the latter control the
former, it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order that the
appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be assured." If "this
requires an examination of evidence, that examination must be
made." 50 In the particular case the Court concluded that discrimination had been clearly proved, notwithstanding the "mere general asseverations"' of the commissioners, as their testimony was pungently
described.
A multitude of cases in the modern Court attest the vitality and
the importance of this concept of the scope of review, especially in
cases that have constitutional dimension: contempt, libel, obscenity,
protest and political agitation, other first amendment areas, coerced
confessions and pleas, involuntary waiver of counsel or other protections and the evergrowing field in which purposeful discrimination is
forbidden. 51 It is certainly a modest judgment that the scope and

intensity of the Supreme Court's scrutiny of state fact findings in
such cases has steadily expanded through the years.
A further principle has been developed that has bearing on this
matter, the rule that a state court judgment,' at least a criminal
conviction, even though it has no other federal dimension, entails a
deprivation of procedural due process if there was "no evidence" to
support a finding that was necessary under the state law to sustain
the judgment rendered. This was declared in Thompson v.
294 U.S. 587 (1935).

Id. at 590.
s' Id. at 595.
52

For an extensive collection of the cases, see THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
supra note 3, at 574-610 (2d ed. 1973), 100-02 (Supp. 1977).
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Louisville," decided unanimously in 1960, in opinion by Justice Black
(a case in which my colleague Louis Lusky was counsel for the petitioner). The principle was invoked and applied, some may believe,
as I do, somewhat excessively applied, in many cases of importance
during the civil rights struggle of recent memory, 4 avoiding thereby
a pronouncement on constitutional contentions with respect to which
there was a close division in the Court."5 It is apparently a settled
interpretation of the meaning of "due process," not to be avoided, as
it would have been in former years, by reading the affirmance of the
judgment by the highest state court as an implied ruling that the
element on which there was no evidence had been excluded from the
state rule involved. The case for perceiving such an implication was
put strongly in a recent dissent by Justice Rehnquist, but he was
supported only by the Chief Justice and by Justice White." If the
Thompson principle is settled, I should suppose that it may apply to
civil cases also;57 indeed, Thompson's sentence was no more than a
small fine. But I know of no civil applications thus far handed down.
An even more significant review of facts may yet be found appropriate in criminal cases. This was suggested in a very recent dissent
to a denial of certiorari by Mr. Justice Stewart. The case was one
that Mr. Justice Marshall thought deserved review on the issue of no
evidence. Justice Stewart did not agree with that but thought that a
more fundamental question ought to be considered. Since In re
Winship59 held that due process forbids a criminal conviction under
any lesser standard of evaluation of the evidence than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, does not any criminal conviction violate due
process "where the evidence cannot fairly be considered sufficient to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?" That is not, as I see it,
- 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (conviction of loitering and disorderly conduct based solely
on evidence that defendant had been in cafe half an hour without buying anything,
was "on the floor dancing by himself" and argued with policeman after they arrested
him for loitering).
11 See, e.g., Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Garner
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
Cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226 (1964).
Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 484 (1974).
57There is a suggestion, however, in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 35456 (1964), that the principle is rooted in the due process requirement that a criminal
statute give fair notice of the conduct proscribed as a crime, but the rationale of
Thompson was not so limited. See Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 n.13
(1960).
' Freeman v. Zahradnick, 97 S. Ct. 1150 (1977).
' 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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a question that can easily be turned aside; federal review not only
tests a standard on its face but also in its application. An affirmative
response would, however, mean that even though no other federal
dimension is presented by the case, a submission that the evidence
did not suffice for a rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would present a federal question. All state convictions
would thus be subject to no less evidential scrutiny by the federal
courts than state systems normally provide upon a state appeal. It is
worth keeping such a possibility in mind in turning, as I now propose
to do, from the legal scope of the appellate jurisdiction to the practical limits on its exercise, given the size of the Supreme Court's docket
in our time.
The Problem of Logistics
The jurisdiction I have attempted to delineate has, as you know,
produced a dramatic increase in the number of cases filed in recent
years in the Supreme Court, reflecting the explosive growth of litigation in the country, particularly in the lower federal courts. In 1950,
for example, the Supreme Court filings totaled 1181. In 1971, they
had risen to 3643; in 1975 to 3939. The growth in the number of cases
filed in the federal courts of appeals, from which almost three quarters of the cases of the high Court's docket now derive, was no less
spectacular: from 3899 in 1960 to 18,408 in 1976. Some twenty-six
percent of Supreme Court filings were from the state courts in 1972,
compared to almost fifty percent in 1962.
Most of the cases filed in the high court are, to be sure, petitions
for discretionary Teview. Some are, however, appeals, invoking review
that the statute conceives to be obligatory, i.e., to entitle the appellant to a decision on the merits of his claim of error. Precise data are
not available, but it would seem that appeals in recent years have not
exceeded ten percent of all the cases filed and the number should
substantially diminish with the virtual elimination now of direct appeals from three-judge district courts." There were, however, in 1971,
according to one study, appeals on the docket from state courts in 158
cases."
" That dimunition may, however, be accompanied by an increase in appeals
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1970) from Court of Appeals decisions holding state statutes
invalid on federal grounds.
", REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, Table VIIa, at A 11 (1972). Petitions for certiorari in state cases totaled 1183.
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Despite this increase in the number of cases seeking to be heard,
the Supreme Court allows, and in the nature of things is able to allow,
plenary hearings in a very small number, determined quite inexorably by the number of hours in the day, days in the week and weeks
in the year, together with the time required for adequate deliberation,
reasoned decision and the preparation of opinions that will both explain results and provide guidance to all other courts.12 The number
of cases thus decided in recent terms has ranged from perhaps 130 to
160, with a norm below 150, exclusive of multiple causes dealt with
together. At the 1975-76 term, there were 135 signed opinions of the
Court, not counting concurrences or dissents, and 21 per curiam opinions of substantial length, disposing in all of 181 cases. There were,
in addition, 175 dispositions without opinion, mostly in unargued
cases, and an as yet uncounted number of dismissals of appeals that
constitute adjudication on the merits. 3 It seems clear, therefore, that
given present volume the great functions of the Court must be performed by denying most of the petitions for discretionary review and
by summary disposition on the initial papers of a great part of the
business claiming the right to a decision on the merits.
In last year's Tucker lecture, former Dean and Solicitor General
Erwin N. Griswold spoke critically of the Court's summary disposition (without full briefs and oral argument) of cases reviewable as of
right upon appeal." If he meant that this is never permissible, I
disagree. It was a reasonable view of the statute to treat the substantiality of the federal question as jurisdictional and to determine that
preliminarily. That was, indeed, what happened in the Court when
John Randolph Tucker represented the Chicago anarchists, a great
episode in the history of our profession. 5 As a Supreme Court rule of
1876 expressed the point, a motion to dismiss or affirm would be
entertained on the ground that "the question on which the jurisdiction depends is so frivolous as not to need further argument."', The
jurisdictional statement was required by rule in 1928 to raise the
'2 Cf. Hart, Foreword:The Time Chartof the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959).

'3 The Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56, 276, 279 (1976).
" Griswold, Equal Justice UnderLaw, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 813, 818-21 (1976).
" Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887) (denying a motion made in open court to
allow a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which had denied the application). The Court in its discretion heard oral argument in support of the motion but
that practice was unusual, since, as Chief Justice Waite said, it had been settled that
"the writ ought not to be allowed by the court, if it appears from the face of the record
that the decision of the Federal question which is complained of was so plainly right
as not to require argument. -... " Id. at 164.
91 U.S. vii (1876) (amendment to Rule 6).
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question for the Court even in the absence of a motion. That basic
concept is reflected and elaborated in the current rules.
It follows therefore, and was never doubted when I was a law clerk
in 1932, that a dismissal on the ground that a federal submission is
not substantial is a disposition on the merits. Justice Brennan articulated this in 19599 and the Court reaffirmed the proposition quite
explicitly in 1975.68 That means that, as the Hicks case squarely held,
the dismissal creates a precedent binding on lower courts until and
unless the Supreme Court overrules it." There may be difficulty, to
be sure, in ascertaining precisely what was decided 0 but whatever
was decided is the law. It is, therefore, hard to understand the recent
statement by Mr. Justice Clark, sitting in this Circuit, that during
his eighteen years of service on the Supreme Court, "appeals from
state decisions received treatment similar to that accorded petitions
for certiorari .

.

."I' If

that was so, and I well know, of course, that

others have asserted that it was, 72 the Court simply disregarded its
statutory duty to decide appealed cases on the merits. It may be
hoped the practice now has changed. It is simply inadmissible that
the highest court of law should be lawless in relation to its own jurisdiction. On that point, I agree entirely with Dean Griswold.
Whether the statute ought to be amended is, however, as Dean
Griswold recoghized, a different question. Lawyers will understanda,7 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959).
I Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); see also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 646 (1976); Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm.
v. Port of New York Auth., 387 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.). But cf. Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 615-16, 487 P.2d 1241, 1263-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 623-24 (1971).
" Though the Supreme Court has announced that it accords less precedential
weight to summary dispositions than to decisions supported by opinion, see Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974), it has not agreed with Justice Brennan that the
same latitude should be allowed to state and lower federal courts. See Colorado Springs
Amusements Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); Sidle v. Majors, 97 S. Ct. 366, 367 (1976) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
11Mandel v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2238 (1977); cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379,
390-92 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (summary affirmance extends to the lower
court's judgment but not to the lower court's reasoning and should not be read, therefore, as a renunciation of any previously announced Supreme Court opinion); see also,
e.g., Torres v. Department of Labor, 405 U.S. 949 (1972).
7' Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 836 (1975) (Clark, J., concurring).
72 See, e.g., G. CASPER & A. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 1
(1976); REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 25 (1972);
Remarks of Mr. Justice Marshall, Acceptance of Learned Hand Medal, May 1, 1975,
at 10. The most informative study is that of Levin & Hellman, The Many Roles of the
Supreme Court and the Constraintsof Time and Caseload,7 U. TOL. L. REv. 399, 40417 (1976).
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bly be reluctant to surrender any right of access to the Court that the
law now allows, but the problem of volume places a heavy burden of
persuasion on those who would support the present rule. It is hard to
argue that every case in which a state statute or ordinance is sustained against a substantial federal attack, especially if it is only
challenged as applied, 3 merits priority in the selection of the very
finite number of cases that the high Court can decide.
I should myself place emphasis, however, on a different question.
Given the intrinsic quantitative limits on the adjudications that the
Court can make, the need for authoritative settlement of issues that
divide the courts of appeals, the importance of a viable procedure to
correct egregious error by state courts in applying principles and
standards the Supreme Court has developed, especially in constitutional interpretation, can the Supreme Court's options be enlarged in
a constructive way?
The Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System (the Hruska Commission, on which I served) recommended
some two years ago the creation of a National Court of Appeals,
whose jurisdiction would be limited to cases referred for adjudication
by the Supreme Court (or transferred to it by a regional court of
appeals) .74 The purpose was primarily to enlarge the appellate capacity of the federal courts to settle questions that are not now settled
soon enough because of docket pressures in the Supreme Court. 75 This
was a wholly different proposition from that offered by the Study
Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court" (Freund Committee)
whose main target was to relieve the Court of most of the burden
involved in screening petitions for review. That proposal met insuper11 See note 17 supra.

71 S. 2762, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., embodying the recommendations of the Commission, included provision for such transfers. That feature of the plan drew such widespread opposition that it was withdrawn in the revised bill, S. 3423, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., which limits the jurisdiction of the National Court to cases referred by the
Supreme Court. See Hearingson S. 2762 and S. 3423, The National Court of Appeals
Act, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 52 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearingsl.
"' Some members of the Commission, myself included, were concerned as well to
enhance the capacity of federal courts to correct egregious state court errors in applying
settled federal standards, a matter given insufficient attention in the Commission's
report. Cf. Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The
Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 943 (1976). I do not agree,
however, with the proposal of Professor Stolz that the National Court of Appeals
should be given obligatory jurisdiction to review state court judgments involving federal questions, subject to discretionary review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court's power to refer state as well as federal cases, as the Commission recommended,
serves the purpose adequately, in my view.

" See note 61 supra.
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able opposition, grounded in the view that the Court should not be
deprived of the control of its own docket. Under the Commission
plan, such control would be maintained. Judgments of the National
Court would bind the country as a whole but they would be reviewable by the Supreme Court on certiorari. It was anticipated, however,
that, having referred the case, the high Court would not often grant
review. No one, of course, can predict with confidence whether or how
soon the new Court's docket would be full7 but nothing would be lost
if the development were slow. The judges could devote their extra
time to sitting in the circuits on assignment; their assistance there
would certainly be welcome for as far ahead as we can see.
There are objections to the plan, of course: it would add to rather
than diminish the screening task of the Supreme Court because of the
option to refer; it would diminish somewhat the prestige of the regional courts of appeals; it would add a fourth appellate tier in the
federal system if the Supreme Court were subsequently to review a
case it had referred; and it would offend the highest state courts to
have their judgments subject to reversal by a court inferior to the
Supreme Court.
These are all points of substance, I admit, but the great question
is if there is an alternative that presents lesser difficulties. Judge
Henry Friendly argues strongly that there is: avert "the flood by
lessening the flow.""8 He would eliminate diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, cut back on civil rights cases by requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies and greater abstention, limit the scope of
federal habeas corpus, transfer much litigation to administrative
agencies and processes, reduce the ambit of the federal criminal law,
and establish specialized courts, at least for tax and patent cases. 9
This is a solid program, with a great deal of which I find myself in
full agreement. The trouble is that it is most improbable that much
of it can be enacted, or so it seemed to me as I heard testimony in
the hearings of the Hruska Commission. Time may, however, prove

11For varying forecasts, see, e.g., G.

CASPER

& A.

POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE

106 (1976); Feinberg, Foreword - A National Court of Appeals?, 42
BROOKLYN L. REv. 611, 619-25 (1976); Owens, The Hruska Commission's Proposed
National Court of Appeals, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 580, 603 (1976); Alsup, Reservations
on the Proposal of the Hruska Commission to Establish a NationalCourt of Appeals,
7 U. TOL. L. REV. 431, 435 (1976); Hearings,supra note 74, at 135 (Judge Lay), 172,
184 (Judge Coffin), 248, 256 (Judge Friendly).
"I Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 634
(1974); see also Hearings, supra note 74, at 250-56; cf. THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL
SUPREME COURT

COURTS: REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL

(1977).
7' See generally H.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:

A

GENERAL VIEW

(1973).
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me wrong on this, as all too often it has proved me wrong before, but
thus far I perceive no reason for confessing error.
The crucial point is that alternatives be canvassed with a will to
getting something done. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is a great national achievement, but we do not honor it by
failing to perceive and to respect its limitations of capacity. We must
reduce the burden it is asked to carry in the legal system or accord it
supplementary resources. The promise that is spoken to the ear will
otherwise be broken to the hope.
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